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takes both the broad environmental context 
(e.g., the current place: restaurant or swim-
ming pool) and the internal state (including 
for instance metabolic needs) of the indi-
vidual agent into account. The “behavior 
setting” (Barker, 1968; Heft, 2001) is an 
excellent predictor of what action possibili-
ties will show up for a person as relevant: 
when we are in a restaurant the possibility of 
calling a waiter is relevant but not when we 
are in a supermarket. Moreover, affordances 
can solicit activity because they are bod-
ily potentiating. A relevant affordance can 
generate bodily “action readiness” (Frijda, 
1986, 2007), that is, the readiness of the 
affordance-related ability (Rietveld, 2008). 
Just as our hand prepares itself to grasp a 
cup when we make a reaching movement 
for a cup, so also can being in a particu-
lar behavior setting like a restaurant make 
certain action possibilities more salient to 
us. In both cases we find ourselves bodily 
ready to deal with particular aspects of a 
familiar environment. Once we recognize 
the richness of the landscape of affordances 
in any given context of activity, this gener-
ates  parsimonious answers to old questions 
about the relation between mind and world 
(Rietveld and Kiverstein, under review), but 
it also opens up a host of difficult questions 
for cognitive scientists. How is it possible 
that in any given situation an agent is able 
to hone in on the action possibilities that 
are relevant while also remaining sensitive 
to other action possibilities of potential rel-
evance? In a dynamic environment in which 
our situation is continuously undergoing 
change, how do we take new information 
into account in such a way as to produce 
actions that fit with the behavior setting in 
which we are embedded?
Action-oriented predictive processing 
as described by Clark is, we are sure, an 
important part of the answer to these hard 
questions (Kiverstein, 2012). Part of the 
reason why it is well equipped to answer 
these difficult questions is because it pro-
vides us with an account of neural pro-
cessing on which perception, action, and 
cognition are as Clark puts it “deeply uni-
fied.” A challenge that remains for Clark’s 
action-oriented theory of the brain is to 
account for how our skillful unreflective 
actions involve the integration of the whole 
system of brain, body, and the landscape 
of available affordances in which we are 
situated.
The phenomenology of skillful unre-
flective action in everyday life provides 
us with a clue here. In a skilled individ-
ual’s responsiveness to a field of relevant 
affordances (Rietveld et al., 2012; BBS) it is 
not only perception, action, and cognition 
that are profoundly unified, but also affect 
and the eco-niche or environment. Thanks 
to our skill and expertise often we find our-
selves in a situation in which affect makes it 
immediately obvious to us how we should 
respond. Take the case of responsiveness 
to social affordances: a friend’s sad face 
invites comforting behavior, a colleague at 
a coffee machine affords a conversation, 
and the extended hand of a visitor solicits 
a handshake. Affect plays a crucial role in 
preparing us to act in these cases: it signals 
which possibilities for action in a situation 
matter to us in sense of being relevant to 
us given our interests and needs. Thus it 
contributes toward an agent’s selective per-
ception of and responsiveness to the action 
possibilities available in a given situation. 
Affect can also play a role in keeping us 
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Contemporary neuroscience seems to be 
undergoing an intriguing pragmatist turn 
(Engel, 2010). Clark’s action-oriented 
account of the predictive brain offers an 
original and interesting take on pragmatist 
neuroscience. The idea that cognition is for 
action is of course central to the embodied 
program of research in cognitive science. 
Clark’s account of the predictive brain pro-
vides a promising proposal about how the 
brain might contribute to embodied cogni-
tion. However within the predictive coding 
framework there is also recognition of the 
important role played by context in every-
day action over multiple time scales (Kiebel 
et al., 2008). We will argue that the context 
sensitivity of action-oriented processing is 
not adequately recognized in Clark’s target 
article. The ecological notion of a niche 
(e.g., Gibson, 1979) is for instance central 
in Friston (2011) account of embodied cog-
nition, but we find it curiously absent in the 
account Clark gives of action.
An animal’s eco-niche is made up of 
affordances (Gibson, 1979; Chemero, 2003) 
or possibilities for action provided to the ani-
mal by an environment – by the substances, 
surfaces, objects, and other living creatures 
that surround it. Importantly, affordances 
are always perceived in the context of many 
other affordances available in the niche (cf. 
Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). The landscape of 
affordances on offer in a given environment 
is exceptionally rich (particularly in the case 
of humans) and is responded to in a way that 
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apprised of how well an action is going 
when we are in the flow of performing an 
action (see Rietveld, 2008). “The context” 
is not a static pre-given: What is in the fore-
ground and what is in the background for 
us constantly shifts, depending both on 
what happens in the environment, and 
on our current concerns. In other words, 
affect contributes to the structuring of the 
field of relevant affordances in the particu-
lar situation.
No doubt this can partly be explained 
in terms of action-oriented predictive 
processing and the cascades of generative 
models that are able to successfully pre-
dict how to bring about the sensory con-
sequences the agent anticipates. However 
we would argue that a challenge for Clark 
remains to integrate this neural level expla-
nation with what the phenomenology of 
everyday agency tells us. More precisely, we 
must account for how neural processing 
is always taking place within a particular 
situation in which specific possibilities of 
action stand out from a larger landscape 
of affordances as soliciting or motivating 
for the agent.
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